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Constant Conjunction accounts of Causation
Constant conjunction accounts of causation claim that, whenever C
happens, E happens. That is, C is a sufficient
for E. E could happen without C, because there might be other
things that can cause it, but if C happens, E inevitably will.
No-one holds naive constant conjunction accounts, because they
are obviously false. (For example, the light does not always come
on when I flick the switch, because sometimes the bulb is blown.)
More sophisticated versions are still popular, however.
John Mackie has developed a very sophisticated version of this
account, in Mackie 1965
Responses include Kim 1971
and Davidson 1967
If C causes both E and F, then E and F always occur together. Thus,
this is a major issue for this type of account.
If E might not happen, even though C does, C cannot be a sufficient
condition for E. Thus, this sort of account has serious problems
with probabilistic causation.